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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LUIS G. STELZNER* and DARREL JILES**
I. INTRODUCTION***
The New Mexico courts considered a variety of criminal procedure
cases during the Survey year. These cases fall into no easy categories.
In the first section of this article, the cases are generally divided according
to those provisions of the United States Constitution they construe. The
second portion of the article discusses various areas of criminal procedure
including sentencing, prosecutorial conduct, juries, plea bargains, and
destruction of evidence. The authors have chosen to discuss the most
significant criminal procedure cases-about two thirds of the relevant
cases decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
during the Survey year.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Probable Cause
1. Confidential Informants
In State v. Baca,' the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed an affidavit
for a search warrant containing, inter alia, hearsay information from two
confidential sources. The court found that the affidavit did not meet the
established Aguilar/Spinelli standards for probable cause.2 Although the
court found the informant sufficiently credible, it rejected the affidavit
because it contained insufficient factual basis for the information supplied
by the informant. The affidavit merely stated the informant's own con-
clusions about the defendant and his activities without any supporting
*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
**Supervising Editor, New Mexico Law Review, 1982-83.
***Mr. Jiles discusses sections II-IV, and Professor Stelzner discusses the remaining sections.
1. 97 N.M. 379, 640 P.2d 485 (1982).
2. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In
Aguilar, the Supreme Court said that in order for a tip from a confidential informant to be considered
valid for purposes of a search warrant based on probable cause, it must (1) describe some of the
underlying circumstances showing how the informant knew what he claimed to know; and (2) give
some reasons why the affiant believes the informant is credible. 378 U.S. at 114. In Spinelli, the
Court explained that a deficiency in the first part of the Aguilar test could be overcome by a sufficiently
detailed description from the informant that is corroborated by police investigation. 393 U.S. at
416.
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data.3 The supreme court relied on State v. Duran4 and N.M. R. Crim.
P. 17(f)5 for the New Mexico statement of the Aguilar/Spinelli test.
This holding follows United States v. Ventresca,6 in which the United
States Supreme Court stated that probable cause may not be made out
by "affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only the affiant's or
an informer's belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of
the 'underlying circumstances' upon which that belief is based." '7 The
Baca case should stand as a reminder to law enforcement officers and
magistrates alike that mere conclusory statements in search warrants will
not be sustained at the appellate level.
2. Second Hand Sources of Information
In State v. Martinez,8 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a law
enforcement officer who makes an arrest or search at the request of another
officer or at the call of a dispatcher may justifiably assume that the one
making the request had probable cause for the intrusion. In this Survey
year, the New Mexico Court of Appeals applied this rule to out-of-state
law enforcement sources of probable cause. In State v. Powell,9 a New
Mexico magistrate was presented with an affidavit for a search warrant
which recited details of narcotics offenses committed by defendants in
Texas. The affidavit did not specifically state why the information should
be considered reliable but it did say that the information came from
narcotics agents for the Texas Department of Public Safety.'" Relying on
Martinez and United States v. Ventresca, the court of appeals found that
the magistrate could reasonably rely on the information supplied by the
Texas agents. In Ventresca, however, unlike the situation in Powell, the
affiant had personal knowledge of the events he described as well as
3. The informant said that he had "first hand personal knowledge" about the kind of automobile
the defendant had access to, that the defendant was "known by the informant to be involved in
narcotics transactions," and that he had "personal knowledge" that the defendant often carried a
weapon similar to that used in the crime. 97 N.M. at 381, 640 P.2d at 487.
4. 90 N.M. 741, 568 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1977). "It is of vital importance that the reliable
confidential informant or affiant describe the criminal activity in sufficient detail so that the magistrate
has something substantial to rely on and not a casual rumor circulating in the underworld." Id. at
743, 568 P.2d at 269 (emphasis by the court).
5. N.M. R. Crim. P. 17(f) states that the probable cause necessary for a search warrant "shall be
based upon substantial evidence, which may be hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a
substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there
is a factual basis for the information furnished."
6. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
7. Id. at 108-109.
8. 94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 959 (1980).
9. 96 N.M. 569, 632 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1981).
10. Id. at 570, 632 P.2d at 1208.
11. 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (observations of fellow officers of the government engaged in common
investigation are a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number).
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information from other officers. 2 In Powell, the affiant recited no facts
from personal observation. The Powell court did not justify this reliance
only on the basis of the fact that the information came from law enforce-
ment officers. The court also specifically noted that the State of Texas
itself has issued arrest warrants for these same defendants based on this
information.
The decision may pose a problem for some future defendants. When
the probable cause for their arrest 3 or search warrant is drawn from an
out-of-state police officer it may be uneconomical and ineffective for the
defendant to challenge the affidavit. He may find it practically impossible
to question the credibility of the ultimate source of the information. The
Powell opinion is silent on how the Texas authorities received their in-
formation. While the New Mexico magistrate may rely on the Texas
magistrate's findings that the original source was believable, the defendant
may have no way of reaching that ultimate source.
In addition, there were no exigent circumstances presented in Powell.
With the communications facilities now available to law enforcement
personnel, there does not appear to be any reason why the New Mexico
officers could not have easily acquired a copy of the underlying circum-
stances relied upon by the Texas authorities in the initial determination
of probable cause. If left unrefined, the Powell decision will permit Las
Cruces police officers and magistrates to rely on second-level probable
cause determinations if the source were an El Paso police source while
a Farmington magistrate could not place the same reliance on information
received from Las Cruces. One can wonder why this exception is needed
at all.
B. Warrant Requirement Exceptions
1. Automobile Exception/Container Search
[T]he law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is in-
tolerably confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what
it has held previously, let alone on how these cases should be de-
cided. 4
Although Mr. Justice Powell wrote this in reference to the United States
Supreme Court, much the same could be said about the New Mexico
appellate courts' approaches to the problem. Indeed, New Mexico not
12. Id. at 103.
13. The opinion does not specifically say that this rule applies to arrest warrants as well, but the
Martinez opinion, upon which the court of appeals relied, stated: "an arrest or search warrant must
be supported by affidavit, when based upon information from an informant, setting forth facts showing
the reliability of the informant and probable cause." 94 N.M. at 440, 612 P.2d at 232 (emphasis
added).
14. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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only reflects the federal inconsistency, it also fosters its own. This became
apparent in this Survey year in the New Mexico Supreme Court's reversal
of the previous year's court of appeals decision in State v. Capps.'5
In Capps, an Artesia police officer made a valid stop 6 of a car in which
the defendant was a passenger. While he was questioning the driver about
the ownership of the car, the officer smelled the odor of raw marijuana.
The driver then gave his consent for the officer to look into the trunk.
The officer discovered nine dark green plastic trash bags inside the trunk. 17
The officer poked a hole in one of the green bags and found that it
contained a portion of the more than eighty pounds 8 of marijuana found
in the trunk. The police took the bags to the evidence locker and im-
pounded the car.' 9
The court of appeals had found that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in these containers and held that a search warrant
was required.20 The supreme court majority disagreed. It said that this
was not a container case at all2' but was "within the extents of the
automobile exception." 2 2 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Sosa noted that the
United States Supreme Court held in Robbins v. California,23 on almost
identical facts, that such a search was not authorized by the so called
"automobile exception." 24 In the Robbins plurality opinion, the Court
held that the police may not search a closed container unless the con-
tainer's shape or appearance clearly reveals its contents. 25
"Automobile exception" is the unfortunately misleading label assigned
to one of the exceptions 26 to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
15. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 399 (Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1981), rev'd, 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484
(1982). For a discussion of the court of appeals decision, see Stelzner, Criminal Procedure, Survey
of New Mexico Law: 1980-81, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 271, 279-80 (1982).
16. This stop was the subject of an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress. The court of appeals' memorandum opinion upheld the validity of the stop. See 20 N.M.
St. B. Bull. at 400.
17. Each green bag contained marijuana that was triple wrapped and taped in opaque bags and
sealed shut. Id. at 401.
18. The supreme court said that it was approximately eighty-eight pounds, 97 N.M. at 454 n. 1,
641 P.2d at 485 n.2; the court of appeals said eighty-four, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 401.
19. It is necessary to read three accounts for the best understanding of the facts: the majority's,
97 N.M. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485; the dissent's (Sosa, J., dissenting), Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 490;
and the court of appeal's, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 400.
20. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 400. The court relied on State v. White, 94 N.M. 687, 615 P.2d
1004 (Ct. App. 1980) (warrant required for search of contents of sealed boxes and bags stored in
trunk of automobile).
21. 97 N.M. at 457, 641 P.2d.at 488.
22. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
23. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
24. Id. at 424 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 427.
26. Some of the others are: search incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); and consent, Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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The automobile is only accidently associated with this exception, 7 and
perhaps the better designation would be the "Carroll Doctrine," after the
case of Carroll v. United States.2" The doctrine is a two-part test which
must be met to establish that a search of a constitutionally protected area
is valid: (1) there must be probable cause to believe that there is evidence
of a crime in the place to be searched; and (2) there is an exigency that
the evidence will disappear because it is located in a place that is mobile.
29
In Capps, the supreme court found that the aroma of marijuana was
sufficient probable cause for the officer to search the automobile.30 The
court found the second part of the test was met and relied on United
States v. Milhollan.3 n In Milhollan, the Third Circuit held that "the jus-
tification for the search must arise suddenly and unexpectedly. ' 32 The
New Mexico court reasoned that, because the officer was not looking for
marijuana when he stopped the car, the unexpected smell of marijuana
and the mobility of the automobile supplied all the exigency that was
necessary.33
The court apparently did not view Capps as a container case because
the officer was looking for marijuana, not a specific container. 4 This
appears to be a departure from the usual way of analyzing these cases.
The majority stated that "[i]f there is probable cause to search for a
particular item, the officer can search every container and location within
the permitted area where that item could be located." 35
The supreme court distinguished Capps from Robbins in one paragraph.
27. As noted by the majority in the supreme court Capps opinion, for an excellent exposition of
this exception, see Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What it is and What it is Not-A Rationale
in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976).
28. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Carroll is further explained in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977).
29. 267 U.S. at 149, 153.
30. 97 N.M. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485.
31. 599 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 909 (1979).
32. 599 F.2d at 526. Milhollan was decided three months before Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979), and two years before Robbins (see infra note 39 for a discussion of Sanders). In Milhollan,
the circuit court justified the search of a satchel within an automobile by relying on two cases,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (not a container case), and another Third Circuit case,
United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976). The Milhollan court's statement that the
justification for the search must arise suddenly and unexpectedly came from Vento. The Vento court
was not re-defining "exigency" to simply mean "a sudden and unexpected discovery." It was instead
specifying the exigency surrounding the search of that particular automobile. In Vento, the exigency
was that confederates of the arrestee were nearby and might easily have removed the evidence.
Furthermore, the police in Vento had probable cause to search a specific paper bag which was later
placed in the automobile. Id. at 865-67. In Milhollan (and in Capps as well), the court only mentioned
the "sudden and unexpected" character of the discovery of the suspect containers, not the existence
of any identifiable exigency. 599 F.2d at 526.
33. 97 N.M. at 456, 641 P.2d at 487. The majority failed to point out in its rationale that the
mobility of the automobile had been diminished by the fact that, at the time of the search, the
suspects were under arrest and the officer had possession of the keys. Id. at 459, 641 P.2d at 490.
34. Id. at 457, 641 P.2d at 488.
35. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
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Under Robbins, once the police have seized a container, the likelihood
of its mobility is significantly reduced; the exigency thus disappears. The
Capps opinion stated, "The officer here never seized the plastic bags.
While the bags were in the car, he tore a hole in them." 36
The dissent argued that:
The majority tells all police officers that they can rummage through
all containers located in an automobile undergoing a lawful war-
rantless search, so long as they do not "seize" the containers. The
rationale of the majority is that the automobile is "mobile." This is
wrong. The only question is whether the officer should have taken
the bags along with the defendants to the police station and then
should have obtained a warrant to search the bags, rather than im-
mediately searching the bags without a warrant.
37
Justice Sosa answered this question in the affirmative,38 citing Robbins
and Arkansas v. Sanders39 as authority.
The majority, however, was apparently anticipating a change in the
United States Supreme Court's handling of these cases.4" If this is true,
the court guessed correctly. In United States v. Ross4 the United States
Supreme Court overruled Robbins42 and some of the reasoning in Sanders43
and declared an unequivocal rule that police and courts could more easily
follow. The Court succinctly stated the rule:
We hold that the scope of warrantless searches authorized by that
exception [the Carroll Doctrine] is no broader and no narrower than
a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies
the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may
conceal the object of the search. 44
36. Id. This statement is, of course, incorrect. See supra text accompanying note 19.
37. Id. at 462, 641 P.2d at 493 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (containers which are found in a vehicle that is being subjected to a
lawful warrantless search may be searched only upon a showing of genuine exigent circumstances).
The Sanders court noted that:
[t]here ar essentially two reasons for the distinction between automobiles and
other private property. First, as the court repeatedly has recognized, the inherent
mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. . . .In
addition, the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute
the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated
property.
Id. at 761.
40. The majority noted that the United States Supreme Court had directed the parties in United
States v. Ross, _ U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), to address the question whether the Court
should reconsider Robbins. 97 N.M. at 458 n.6, 641 P.2d at 489 n.6.
41. - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982).
42. Id. at __ 102 S.Ct. at 2172.
43. Id.
44. Id. Compare the Capps rule supra in text accompanying note 35.
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The holdings of Capps and Ross are substantially the same but the
reasoning differs. The Ross court seemed to find that this new rule lay
dormant in Carroll all along. 45 It did not see this as a change in the law
as much as a realization of it. The Capps court, however, sought to
redefine "exigency" in order to justify the use of the Carroll Doctrine.
Practitioners may find that this rule will, indeed, make it easier to deal
on a day-to-day basis with the automobile/container cases because of the
certainty of the rule. Thus, the divergent reasonings may be less important
than the resulting common rule.
2. Border Searches
Searches of persons entering the United States and of the items they,
bring with them have traditionally occupied a unique place in search and
seizure analysis.46 Courts view these searches as being something apart
from the searches that must fulfill the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements of the fourth amendment. 47 They are "reasonable" simply by
virtue of the fact that the persons and items searched have entered the
country48 and that, as a sovereign, the United States has the authority to
protect its territorial integrity.49 They differ from "plain view" and "ex-
igent circumstances" searches because probable cause is not a required
basis for the reasonableness of the search.50
While the sovereign has the authority to conduct searches in seeking
out violations of its customs5' and immigration 2 laws, it need not restrict
its police activities to the immediate border itself. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized a limited extension to the concept of border
searches by permitting searches at the functional equivalent of the border
(e.g. international airports).53
During the Survey year the New Mexico Court of Appeals recognized
a more recent development in border search analysis, the "extended
border search." In State v. Gonzales,54 the court discussed the propriety
of a search that uncovered a cache of marijuana. Border Patrol agents
had reason to believe that the defendant had illegally entered New Mexico
on foot from Mexico carrying a suspiciously large backpack. The agents
did not observe him actually crossing the border but did see him leaving
45. Id. at __ 102 S.Ct. at 2169-70.
46. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (brief history of the unique significance
of the border search analysis).
47. Id.
48. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
49. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979).
50. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
51. 19 U.S.C. §482 (1976).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)(c) (1976).
53. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
54. 97 N.M. 182, 637 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 242, 638 P.2d 1087 (1981).
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a well-established illicit entry trail. Just minutes before, they had elec-
tronically detected someone moving on the same trail. The defendant
then placed his over-sized backpack into the trunk of an automobile. The
agents then detained the defendant and called in a customs agent who
searched the trunk and discovered marijuana.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's claim that fourth amend-
ment analysis should apply to the search. 5 Instead, it found the "border
search" exception to be more appropriate in light of the facts of the case.
The court held that the place of the search56 was not the functional
equivalent of the border; instead the court applied the extended border
concept.
Under the "functional equivalent analysis" the border is, in a sense,
brought to the place of the search,57 as when an international flight lands
at an international airport. The concept of the extended border is similar
but the factual setting is not so clear-cut. In an extended border situation,
there is no similar certainty that the person actually crossed the border.
Instead, inferences are drawn from known facts and a decision is made
as to whether a border exception applies at all. As the Gonzales court
put it, "[a] border crossing is a critical fact" 58 in the analysis. If it appears
that a suspect did not cross an international border, there can be no border
exception.
Because the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the extended
border concept, the New Mexico Court of Appeals looked to the circuit
courts for guidance. 9 The court found that the Fifth Circuit enunciated
the standard for proper extended border searches in United States v.
Richards.6" That standard is: (1) it must be established by a preponderance
of the evidence that a border crossing has occurred;6' (2) it must be
established with reasonable certainty that when searched, the person or
55. 97 N.M. at 185, 637 P.2d at 1240. The court recognized that if fourth amendment analysis
had been applied, the discovered evidence should have been suppressed. For authority the court
cited Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and State v. White, 94 N.M. 687, 615 P.2d 1004
(Ct. App. 1980).
56. The search took place in the parking lot of a tavern, approximately two miles from the border.
97 N.M. at 184-85, 637 P.2d at 1239-40.
57. United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 1976).
58. 97 N.M. at 187, 637 P.2d at 1242.
59. Id. at 186-88, 637 P.2d at 1241-43. The court relied on United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d
765 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jacobson, 647 F. 2d 990 (9th Cir. 1981); Unitd States v. Driscoll,
632 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980); and United
States v. Bilir, 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979).
60. 638 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1981).
61. 97 N.M. at 188, 637 P.2d at 1243. In adopting the preponderance burden, the Gonzales court
expressly declined to use the standards of "reasonable suspicion," United States v. Bilir, 592 F.2d
735 (4th Cir. 1979); "firm belief," United States v. Driscoll, 632 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1980); and
"reasonable certainty," United States v. Jacobson, 647 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1981).
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thing was in the same condition it was in when the border was crossed;62
and (3) before the search, the government agents must have had reasonable
suspicion supported by articulatable facts that the person or thing searched
was involved in illegal activity, such as smuggling contraband. 63 In ap-
plying this test to the facts in Gonzales, the court found the extended
border search exception appropriate and upheld the propriety of the search. 64
The effect of this decision may well be that there will be more and
more searches of individuals at increasing distances from the border,65
while the district courts attempt to apply the elements of this test and the
different evidentary standards for each part of the test. The appellate
courts' next job in the area of extended border searches will be to give
helpful standards for how far the extended border extends.
C. Standing
The fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure is a personal right 66 that cannot be asserted vicariously.67 The
current standard68 used by the courts and set forth by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Salvucci,69 is that the person asserting the right must
have had "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." 70
This expectation is legitimate if two requirements are fulfilled: "first that
a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and
62. The Gonzales court applied the "reasonable certainty" standard of Richards to the unchanged
position of the person or thing searched. It then adopted the Driscoll court's definition of "reasonable
certainty" as "a higher standard than probable cause, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
97 N.M. at 187, 637 P.2d at 1242. In Driscoll, however, the court was applying that standard to
establish the fact of a border crossing, not the unchanged condition. 632 F.2d at 739.
63. 97 N.M. at 187, 637 P.2d at 1242.
64. Id. at 187, 637 P.2d at 1243.
65. The trial courts may find little guidance from authority in this area. In the following cases
the searches were all upheld: United States v. Bilir, 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979) (three to four
miles from the border); United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978) (254 miles from
the border, 20 hours after entry); United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974) (150 miles from the border, 142 hours after entry); United States v.
Majourau, 474 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1973) (80 to 90 miles from the border); Castillo-Garcia v. United
States, 424 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1970) (105 miles from the border). The Immigration and Naturalization
Service considers 100 air miles to be a reasonable distance from the border for purposes of activities
of its agents. 8 C.F.R. § 287. l(a)(2) (1981).
66. This principle was established in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). and
recognized in New Mexico in State v. Ellis, 88 N.M. 90, 92, 537 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1975).
67. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978); State v. Torres, 81 N.M. 521, 527, 469 P.2d
166, 172 (Ct. App. 1970).
68. In an early decision the United States Supreme Court had established the more lenient standard
that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of
a motion to suppress." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960); see also Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464,
466 (1928).
69. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
70. Id. at 92.
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second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.' "7'
In State v. Waggoner,72 the New Mexico Court of Appeals added one
more to the line of New Mexico cases 73 using an expectation of privacy
standard. In Waggoner, the defendants, with their pockets stuffed with
stolen money, asked a stranger to drive them to the bus station. On the
way to the station, an officer legitimately stopped the car, arrested, and
then searched the defendants. The officer then searched the car without
either the driver's or the defendants' consent. Upon searching the auto-
mobile, the officer found more money in the back seat behind a cushion.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress 74 the evidence of the money
found in the car and held that the defendants had no standing.
75
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed that finding because the
defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the back
seat of the driver's car. The Waggoner court reinforced the rule that one
who challenges the legitimacy of a search has a heavy burden in proving
he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. This
ruling is consistent with the strictures of conventional search and seizure
standards. Waggoner leaves unclear, however, what evidence a defendant
must produce in order to show standing when he is a passenger in an
automobile owned by another person.
D. Warrantless Arrest
In State v. Devigne,76 the defendant sought to suppress a confession
made after the police arrested him without a warrant in his own home.
Two weeks after obtaining probable cause to arrest, Albuquerque police
detectives entered the Devignes' home during daylight hours. They ar-
rested him for a series of residential burglaries. The record showed no
exigent circumstances and was silent on the defendant's consent for the
71. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan. J., concurring).
72. 97 N.M. 73, 636 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1981).
73. State v. Barry, 94 N.M. 788, 791, 617 P.2d 873, 876 (Ct. App. 1980) (a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in-premises when he voluntarily grants free access to the premises
to a third party); State v. Chort, 91 N.M. 584, 585, 577 P.2d 892, 893 (Ct. App. 1978) (garden
enclosed by five foot solid wall provides actual expectation of privacy); State v. Aragon, 89 N.M.
91, 94, 547 P.2d 574, 577 (Ct. App. 1974) (open area around curtilage not location to which a
person has a legitimate expectation of privacy); State v. Torres, 81 N.M. 521, 527, 469 P.2d 166,
172 (Ct. App. 1970) (one does not have a privacy interest in the contents of a third party's automobile
parked on one's home property).
74. Defendants' argument for suppression was essentially that even though Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978), was in fact the law of the land, the old "legitimate presence" argument should
still prevail because the court of appeals had not explicitly adopted Rakas yet. Record at 54, State
v. Waggoner (on file at the University of New Mexico School of Law).
75. 97 N.M. at 74, 636 P.2d at 893.
76. 96 N.M. 561, 632 P.2d 1199 (Ct. App. 1981).
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police to enter his home. A detective admitted that they "probably could
have" obtained a warrant because "[w]e had ample probable cause." 77
The defendant moved to suppress two inculpatory statements and a
written confession.78 The trial court denied this motion and Devigne was
subsequently convicted on stipulated facts and on the confession.7 9 On
appeal from the conviction, Devigne argued that the statements should
have been suppressed because they were the fruit of an illegal warrantless
arrest.80
In Payton v. New York, 8 and Steagald v. United States,82 the United
States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohibits the police
from making a warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect's
home in order to make a routine felony arrest.83 Devigne reminded lower
courts that Payton and Steagald are the law in New Mexico. The court
stated that "the existence of probable cause does not validate the war-
rantless arrest of a person in that person's residence absent consent to
enter or exigent circumstances ' 84 and remanded for a finding on consent.
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
A. Custodial Interrogation
In a pair of cases from the court of appeals, the New Mexico inter-
pretation of what constitutes custodial interrogation within the meaning
of Miranda85 was to some extent clarified.86 In State v. Gonzales,87 the
issue was whether the interrogation was "custodial," and in State v.
Edwards,88 the issue was whether the custodial exchange was "interro-
gation."
In Gonzales, a sheriff's deputy was investigating the theft of a nail
gun. While the deputy was conducting general on-the-scene questioning,
the defendant, Gonzales, agreed to accompany him to trace another sus-
pect. While Gonzales assisted the deputy, he made two statements which
77. Id. at 563, 632 P.2d at 1201.
78. At the trial level the defendant argued (1) that he was not properly advised of his right to
remain silent; (2) that he did not waive his right to remain silent; and (3) that his statements were
involuntary. These were not the grounds raised on appeal. Id. at 562, 632 P.2d at 1200.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
82. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
83. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576; Steagald, 451 U.S. at 1211-12.
84. 96 N.M. at 563, 632 P.2d at 1201.
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. For a discussion of conflicting approaches to New Mexico law in this area, see Stelzner,
Criminal Procedure, Survey of New Mexico Law: 1980-81, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 271, 295 (1982).
87. 96 N.M. 556, 632 P.2d 1194 (Ct. App. 1981).
88. 97 N.M. 141,637 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1981).
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the trial court later refused to suppress. The first was an inculpatory
declaration Gonzales made to the other suspect when the suspect was
located. The second was Gonzales' answer, "No," to the deputy's ques-
tion about whether he had driven the other suspect to town. The deputy
arrested Gonzales after this second statement.
The trial court declined to suppress the first statement because it was
not made to a police officer and admitted the second statement because
neither it nor the first was the result of custodial interrogation. The court
of appeals affirmed both the holding and the reasoning of the trial court.
The court referred to State v. Harge89 which required Miranda warnings
only when "there is such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render
him 'in custody' and subject to a coercive environment. "90 The court also
relied on State v. Montano9 for the proposition that, "[g]eneral on-the-
scene questioning or other general questioning of citizens in the fact
finding process is not considered custodial. "92 Therefore Miranda warn-
ings were not required. The court of appeals' decision and its reliance
on Harge and Montano should provide the practitioner with a clearer
definition of custody.9
3
In Edwards, custody was not at issue because officers had already
arrested the defendant, Edwards, and were escorting him to the detention
center. A third officer then drove up and directed a question to one of
the officers. Edwards responded with an incriminating answer.94 The
defendant moved to suppress this statement, claiming a violation of his
Miranda rights under the fifth amendment.
The court of appeals questioned whether this exchange had been in-
terrogation at all. The court held that it was not because there was no
evidence that (1) the officer knew or should have known his question
would have resulted in an incriminating statement by the defendant; and
(2) the defendant himself perceived that he was being interrogated. The
court explicitly followed the test set up by the United States Supreme
89. 94 N.M. 11, 606 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1979).
90. Id. at 15, 606 P.2d at 1109.
91. 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
92. Id. at 237, 620 P.2d at 891.
93. Gonzales leaves unresolved, however, an apparent inconsistency in the New Mexico treatment
of custodial interrogation problems. It is still not clear how significantly police must restrain a
person's freedom before he is entitled to be advised of his Miranda rights. For a discussion of this
inconsistency in New Mexico law, see Stelzner, Criminal Procedure. Survey of New Mexico Law:
1980-81, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 271, 279 (1982).
94. The officer asked, "Is he the one?" and the defendant replied, "I didn't shoot anybody but
five or six times and if that wasn't enough I would have shot him five or six more." 97 N.M. at
143, 637 P.2d at 574.
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Court in Rhode Island v. Innis,95 in which the Supreme Court attempted
to clarify when the Miranda safeguards came into play. The court of
appeals' interpretation of the Innis test in Edwards appears to be consistent
with the Supreme Court's ruling in that case.
B. Conversations Between Arrestees
In State v. Lucero,96 a police officer secretly seized a conversation
among three arrestees and used it to encourage further incriminating
statements. After the officer had arrested the suspects for commercial
burglary, given them their Miranda warnings, and placed them in his
patrol car, the officer secretly turned on a tape recorder on the front seat
and left the men alone. When he returned to the car he told the men,
"[y]ou might want to listen to this tape," and played it back for them. 97
The suspects initiated a conversation98 with the officer and made additional
incriminating statements. After the defendant, Lucero, arrived at the de-
tention center, he gave a written inculpatory statement. The officer later
erased the tape.
Lucero sought to suppress the oral and written statements, contending
that the surreptitious seizure of his conversation in the patrol car was an
impermissible invasion of his fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure. The court of appeals rejected this argument because,
"[w]hen they sat in [the] patrol car, these suspects had no reasonable
expectation of privacy. Thus, Lucero's oral statement was not the 'fruit'
of an unlawful seizure of evidence."' The court cited a Florida case,
Brown v. State, 1o which had almost identical facts. The Brown court
reasoned that just as a prisoner in jail has no reasonable expectation of
privacy, neither does an arrestee confined in a police vehicle.
95. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of police (other than
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Id. at 300-01.
96. 96 N.M. 126, 628 P.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1981).
97. Id. at 127, 628 P.2d at 697.
98. Although it was not critical in Lucero, in cases decided after Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981), it becomes important whether it is the suspect or the police who initiates a conversation
after the suspect has chosen to exercise his right to be silent following his Miranda warnings.
According to Edwards, "an accused ...having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conver-
sations with the police." Id. at 484-85.
99. 96 N.M. at 128, 628 P.2d at 698.
100. 349 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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Although this was considered a "seizure" for fourth amendment pur-
poses, the defendant raised a fifth amendment challenge-that of vol-
untariness. o' As the court said, "[t]he question then is whether the officer
exerted 'an improper influence' when he played the recorded conversation
back to Lucero."'° 2 According to the court, the sequence of events in-
volved a lawful fourth amendment seizure of a conversation followed by
an uncoerced spontaneous statement. 113
IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The New Mexico Supreme Court decision in State v. Orona""° changed
the previous New Mexico standard for determining whether a defendant's
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been pro-
tected. Orona's claim was that because his attorney stated he did not want
to represent him, the attorney did not render adequate representation.0 5
The supreme court did not agree that this rose to the level of ineffective
assistance of counsel and rejected the claim. 6 Since 1967, the established
standard was the "sham and mockery" test that had been set out in State
v. Moser:17 there is a denial of effective assistance of counsel only where
the trial, considered as a whole, was a mockery of justice, a sham, or a
farce. The court in Orona expressly rejected the sham and mockery test
and adopted the "reasonably competent defense attorney" standard set
forth by the Tenth Circuit in Dyer v. Crise.0
The Dyer court noted that, although most courts in the Tenth Circuit
had said they were using the sham and mockery test, they had actually
been applying a stricter standard. The real test used by most courts was
the "reasonably competent" test: "[tihe Sixth Amendment demands that
defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment, and diligence of a reasonably
competent defense attorney.'" Therefore, the Dyer court's formal adop-
101. Lucero had argued that by playing back the tape, the officer had improperly influenced him
into giving the statement. This, he claimed, was a violation of his fifth amendment right to remain
silent. "To be admissible, a confession must be free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted
by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,
nor by the exertion of any improper influence." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
102. 96 N.M. at 128, 628 P.2d at 698 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970),
for the rule that, to be admissible, the statement must be free of threats, promises, or violence).
103. 96 N.M. at 128, 628 P.2d at 698.
104. 97 N.M. 232, 638 P.2d 1077 (1982).
105. Id. at 234, 638 P.2d at 1079.
106. Id.
107. 78 N.M. 212, 430 P.2d 106 (1967).
108. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
109. 613 F.2d at 278.
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tion of the new rule was not a change in standard, but rather a recognition
of the change which had already taken place." 0
In Orona, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed recent New Mex-
ico cases and found that, for all practical purposes, New Mexico courts
had also already adopted this stricter measure."' The court overruled
earlier cases insofar as they had applied the sham and mockery standard. ",2
V. SENTENCING
In State v. Mabry, ' the trial court convicted the defendant of first-
degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment, the mandatory
sentence prescribed for this crime by statute. I" The defendant challenged
his sentence on the grounds that its mandatory nature violated the doctrine
of separation of powers, and that as applied to him, the sentence was
cruel and unusual because he would not receive adequate treatment in
the state penitentiary for his serious mental and psychological problems.
Mabry based his separation of powers claim on two contentions. Mabry
claimed first that at common law the judiciary possessed the inherent
power to suspend a sentence; his second claim was that the inherent
power was an integral part of the judicial function which the legislature
could not abrogate under the constitutional mandate of separation of
powers. 5
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the separation of powers
claim on two grounds. First, the vast majority of jurisdictions which have
considered the question have rejected a defendant's premise that courts
have the inherent power to suspend sentences. "16 The court observed that
in In re Lujan, "' the only New Mexico case in which the court considered
the judiciary's inherent power to suspend sentences, the supreme court
had concluded that a court was without power to suspend a sentence
absent statutory authorization." 8 The Mabry court stated: "Even assum-
ing, arguendo, that our courts would have possessed such a power at
common law, that power has long been defined and delimited by statute
in New Mexico.""' 9 Second, the supreme court rejected Mabry's sepa-
ration of powers claim because it was "solely within the province of the
110. Id.
111. 97 N.M. at 233-34, 638 P.2d at 1078-79.
112. Practitioners should be aware that earlier New Mexico cases may have stated they were
following the "sham and mockery" test while actually applying a more stringent standard to the
facts. See, e.g., State v. Trivitt, 89 N.M. 162, 168, 548 P.2d 442, 448 (1976).
113. 96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269 (1981).
114. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-3(A) (1978), repealed by 1977 N.M. Laws. ch. 216, § 17.
115. N.M. Const. art. III, § 1.
116. Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 474 (1976). 96 N.M. at 320, 630 P.2d at 272.
117. 18 N.M. 310, 137 P. 587 (1913).
118. 96 N.M. at 320, 630 P.2d at 272.
119. Id.
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Legislature to establish penalties for criminal behavior." 20 A "necessary
incident" of that legislative power was the right to "regulate or restrict
the circumstances in which courts may suspend sentences in order to
ensure the efficacy of those criminal penalties." 2 ' Thus, according to the
Mabry court, whatever the wisdom of mandatory sentencing statutes with
their concomitant removal of judicial discretion in sentencing, the role
of the courts is to defer to that legislative judgment absent a clear showing
of a constitutional violation.
The state supreme court also rejected Mabry's cruel and unusual pun-
ishment argument because he had failed to "prove the factual assertions
of the premise" that he would not receive adequate treatment at the
penitentiary. 22 The court also noted that Mabry had not directed the court
to any authority for his proposition that even with sufficient factual proof,
his cruel and unusual punishment claim would be valid. 23 With this
decision, the state supreme court may have laid to rest the constitutional
challenges of mandatory sentencing schemes. The only recourse for op-
ponents of mandatory sentencing would seem to be with the legislature.
In State v. Sanchez, 124 the court of appeals dealt with two of the issues
raised previously in Mabry. In Sanchez, the state appealed from the trial
court's imposition of a ten-to-fifty year sentence for the defendant's sec-
ond conviction of trafficking in heroin; the statutory penalty for such a
second conviction was imprisonment for life. 25 The defendant's prior
heroin conviction was in 1960, and his current conviction involved the
sale of 1.43 grams of material which contained only. 1% heroin. Because
of the remoteness of the defendant's prior conviction and the infinitesimal
amount of heroin involved, the trial court had found that a life sentence
would be cruel and unusual.
120. Id. at 321, 630 P.2d at 273; see also State v. Archibeque, 95 N.M. 411, 622 P.2d 1031
(1981); State v. Holland, 91 N.M. 386, 574 P.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1978).
121. 96 N.M. at 321, 630 P.2d at 273.
122. Id. at 322, 630 P.2d at 274.
123. Id. There is, however, authority for the proposition that an inmate of a prison has a con-
stitutional right to adequate medical care. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529 n. 11 (1979). That
principle would seem to support the claim in Mabry that a person with an unusual and serious
psychological problem could not be incarcerated if appropriate care and treatment were not available
at the institution.
124. 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 342 (Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1981), cert. granted.
125. The statute in effect at the time of the defendant's conviction was N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-
31-20(B)(2) (1978), which provided that "anyone found guilty of a second trafficking offense is
'guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine . . . or by imprisonment for life, or both.' " 21
N.M. St. B. Bull. at 343. The statute was subsequently amended, and the new statute, N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 30-31-20(B)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1980), provides: "(B) Except as authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act, it is unlawful for any person to intentionally traffic. Any person who violates this
subsection is: . . . (2) for the second and subsequent offenses, guilty of a first degree felony and
shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978." N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-18-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) provides for sentencing of noncapital felonies.
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals primarily relied on Rummel v.
Estelle. 2 6 In Rummel, The United States Supreme Court upheld the im-
position of a mandatory life sentence upon a habitual offender for his
third conviction of a nonviolent theft offense involving a relatively small
amount of money. In essence, the Rummel decision dictated substantial
deference to legislative judgment in assigning term of year sentences,
including life sentences, as penalties for felony offenses. In addition, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals invoked the decision in Terrebonne v.
Blackburn. 127 In Terrebonne, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
a life sentence for a first offense of distributing heroin on the theory that
"[t]he state could reasonably treat heroin distribution as a serious crime
equivalent to crimes of violence."' 28 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
also cited State v. Archibeque, 29 in which the state supreme court upheld
a life sentence for a defendant charged as a habitual offender with four
prior felony convictions. The Archibeque opinion stated: "[T]he judiciary
should not impose its own views concerning the appropriate punishment
for crimes."' 30 Ultimately, and quite properly under Rummel, the Sanchez
court concluded that the remoteness of the prior conviction and the small
amount of heroin involved in the transaction were outweighed by the
state's "strong and substantial interest in deterring and punishing those
who traffic in heroin."'' Although both the Sanchez decision and the
earlier Archibeque decision appear to be completely consistent with the
substantial deference to the legislature rationale articulated in Rummel v.
Estelle, it should be noted that the Rummel court was sharply divided
and that other courts have not been quite so deferential to the legislature
in considering term of years punishments.'32 It should also be noted that
the state supreme court granted certiorari in Sanchez and, at the time this
article was written, had not yet issued its opinion.
In State v. Augustus, "' the defendant raised a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment challenge to his jail sentence, on the ground that he would be
unable to receive needed medical attention under the terms of this sen-
tence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to jail after a plea agree-
ment. Prior to his sentencing, the defendant had undergone open heart
surgery. His physician had written to the court, stating that the defendant
was under a great deal of stress that could complicate his medical situation,
that he needed close follow-up and medical treatment, and therefore it
126. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).'
127. 646 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981).
128. Id. at 1002.
129. 95 N.M. 411, 622 P.2d 1031 (1981).
130. Id. at 412, 622 P.2d at 1032.
131. 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 344.
132. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
133. 97 N.M. 100, 637 P.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1981).
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was preferable that the defendant live in El Paso where treatment was
more readily available. In sentencing the defendant to a 90-day term in
the county jail, the trial court provided that the defendant could be released
on his own recognizance to visit his doctor, if a local physician determined
it necessary. 1
34
In considering the defendant's challenge, the court of appeals first noted
that it construed the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the United
States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution identically.' 3' The
court rejected the defendant's cruel and unusual punishment claim, finding
that the standard set out by the United States Supreme Court in Estelle
v. Gamble16 was not met. Gamble, as the court of appeals observed,
held that there must be a "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs" for a cruel and unusual punishment claim to arise.' 37 Because of
the explicit provision made in the trial court's sentence for medical care
for the defendant and because in the court of appeals' view, the physician's
preferences and advice fell short of establishing serious medical needs,
the court of appeals held that the Estelle standard was not met in the
Augustus case.
It seems clear, however, after Estelle v. Gamble, Mabry, and Augustus,
that a third rubric of cruel and unusual punishment violations now exists
in New Mexico. Traditionally, courts viewed the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause as proscribing two types of practice: first, punishment
such as torture, which was literally cruel and unusual; and, second,
punishment such as the death penalty in rape cases, which was dispro-
portionate to the offense.'38 The more recently recognized third category
goes less to the nature of the sentence itself than to the manner in which
the sentence is imposed, effectively opening the conditions of impris-
onment or sentence to challenge on constitutional grounds. Estelle, Ma-
bry, and Augustus established that one claim of cruel and unusual conditions
of imprisonment may be based on a lack of needed medical or psychiatric
care.
In State v. Stout, ' the state supreme court dealt with the constitutional
implications of enhancement statutes. In Stout, the trial court convicted
the defendant of robbery with a firearm and sentenced him to a term of
not less than fifteen nor more than fifty-five years. Approximately eight
months later, after the defendant had begun serving the sentence, the
district attorney filed a supplementary information alleging a prior con-
134. Id. at 101, 637 P.2d at 51.
135. Id. at 100, 637 P.2d at 50. See U.S. Const. amend. VII1; N.M. Const. art. II, § 13.
136. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
137. 97 N.M. at 101, 637 P.2d at 51.
138. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
139. 96 N.M. 29, 627 P.2d 871 (1981).
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viction of armed robbery and seeking an enhanced sentence of life im-
prisonment in accordance with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-2 (1978).40 After
trial on the supplemental information, the court sentenced the defendant
to life imprisonment.
The defendant raised two constitutional challenges to his enhancement
proceeding. First, he claimed that the filing of the notification of en-
hancement after his conviction denied him due process. Second, the
defendant urged that the initiation of the enhancement proceeding eight
months after he had begun his sentence constituted a violation of his right
not to be placed in double jeopardy. The state supreme court rejected
both challenges. The Stout court relied primarily on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Oyler v. Bowles, 4 ' in which the Court held
that the state need not give the defendant notice before trial that enhance-
ment may be sought after conviction. In the view of the Stout court, State
v. Rhodes 4 ' established the basic due process protections in enhancement
proceedings. Rhodes only required that before the court could impose an
enhanced penalty, a pleading be filed by the state in order to give the
defendant notice and opportunity to be heard. Thus, in Stout, the state
supreme court found that the prosecution had complied with the dictates
of Rhodes because it had filed a pleading, its supplemental information,
prior to seeking the enhanced penalty.'43
As to Stout's double jeopardy claims, the supreme court noted that "in
some case[s] it could violate the defendant's rights to wait a substantial
period of time before enhancement is sought"; but the court simply re-
affirmed a holding it has reached on a number of occasions-that "validly
increasing a sentence under our habitual offender act is not double jeop-
ardy. "'" The court concluded that the fact that the defendant was not
sentenced under New Mexico's habitual offender statute'45 made no ma-
terial difference. The enhancement statute at issue in Stout is essentially
140. Id. at 31, 627 P.2d at 873.
141. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
142. 76 N.M. 177, 181, 413 P.2d 214, 217 (1966).
143. 96 N.M. at 31-32, 627 P.2d at 873-74. In State v. Santillanes, 96 N.M. 477, 632 P.2d 354
(1981), the state supreme court considered Stout to be dispositive. In Santillanes, the defendant
contended that the enhancement proceeding brought under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-20(B) (Repl.
Pamp. 1980), which provides for an enhanced sentence for second and subsequent convictions of
trafficking in controlled substances, must be brought before the defendant has begun serving his
sentence on the most recent convictions. Stout, though dealing with a different enhancement statute,
was clearly directly on point, and the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the state may file
enhancement charges after a defendant has begun serving his sentence on his most recent conviction.
For further discussion of Santillanes, see Hollander, Criminal Law, ante at 333.
144. 96 N.M. at 32, 627 P.2d at 874; see State v. James, 94 N.M. 604, 614 P.2d 16 (1980);
State v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 275, 502 P.2d 300 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 271, 502 P.2d
296 (1972).
145. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
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the same in procedure and purpose as New Mexico's habitual offender
statutes. 146
In State v. Hernandez,'47 the New Mexico Court of Appeals dealt with
two questions related to sentencing: whether the court has the power to
impose a sentence after deferral, and under what circumstances the state
can waive probation violations. Hernandez pled guilty to two counts of
burglary. The court deferred his sentence and ordered that he serve 90
days in the county jail with work release and certain restitution provisions.
The defendant obtained employment and was released from jail during
the day in order to work. He was subsequently laid off and shortly
thereafter his probation officer advised him to return to the jail. He did
not return and within two weeks a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
The warrant was never served. Local police arrested the defendant on a
separate matter three and one-half months later.'48
The court revoked the defendant's deferred sentence and imposed a
sentence of not less than one nor more than five years. The court then
suspended that sentence and placed the defendant on probation for thirty-
six months. As a condition of that probation he was to serve nine months
in jail. The defendant challenged the thirty-six months' probation and the
nine months' jail time on the ground that both exceeded the provisions
in his original sentence. The court of appeals rejected the defendant's
claim. The court agreed that imposition of a suspended sentence was
indeed limited to the balance of the sentence imposed but suspended, but
it distinguished between a deferred and a suspended sentence. 49 In Her-
nandez, the court had deferred the sentence. Thus, it had not imposed a
sentence. Under those circumstances, once a probation violation had been
established, the trial court had authority to impose any sentence which
might have been imposed originally. As to Hernandez's claim that the
state had waived his probation violation because of the delay in his
arrest, 150 the court concluded that it would be permissible to infer from
the evidence that the defendant's whereabouts could have been known
with reasonable diligence. Nevertheless, the court found that the delay
in the Hernandez case was not unreasonable. It reasoned that in order to
be unreasonable, delay must not only be lengthy but must also have some
adverse effect upon the defendant. From the record in Hernandez, it
appeared to the court that the defendant did not claim that he was prej-
146. 96 N.M. at 32, 627 P.2d at 874.
147. 97 N.M. 28, 636 P.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1981).
148. Id. at 29, 636 P.2d at 300.
149. Id. at 31, 636 P.2d at 302.
150. The standard for state waiver of a probation violation was set forth in State v. Murray, 81
N.M. 445, 468 P.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1970): "If there has been unreasonable delay in the issuance
and execution of a warrant against a probation violator whose whereabouts is known or could be
known with reasonable diligence, and the violator's return is possible, the probation authorities, as
a matter of law . . . have waived defendant's violations." Id. at 450, 468 P.2d at 421.
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udiced by the delay in any way. Therefore, "the trial court could properly
consider the three-and-one-half month delay not to be unreasonable." 5'
By imposing this requirement of a showing of prejudice, the court
appeared to be following the model of due process analysis for claims
of pre-indictment 5 ' or pre-arraignment' 53 delay which require the same
showing. The parallels seem appropriate, and suggest that the kind of
prejudice which could be relevant would include prolonged pre-hearing
detention, the pressures and anxieties of continued exposure to the po-
tential of probation revocation, and, most important, the unavailability
of witnesses or loss of memory by witnesses.1
54
In State v. Gonzales, 151 the court of appeals articulated the legal stan-
dards for determining the maximum length of probation in a particular
case. In the Gonzales case, the maximum probation period which the
court could have imposed was eighteen months. The trial court sentenced
the defendant to a term of eighteen months in the penitentiary, to be
followed by one year of parole. The court then suspended all but ninety
days of the defendant's sentence. The defendant challenged the length of
the probationary period because it exceeded the eighteen month maximum
period of incarceration for the offense.
The specific issue presented in Gonzales concerned the definition of
the maximum term which the court could have imposed on Gonzales:
"The total period of suspension shall not exceed the maximum length of
• . . imprisonment which could have been imposed."' 56 The state argued
that the period of parole was part of the maximum sentence which could
have been imposed. The court of appeals rejected this argument and held
that "[t]he parole term is not to be utilized in determining the maximum
length of probation under a suspended sentence,"' 57 because it is served
after completion of any actual imprisonment. 58 Furthermore, statutes
which authorize additional imprisonment, such as for aggravating cir-
cumstances, ' or for use of a firearm,"6° or for a prior felony conviction ,61
151. 97 N.M. at 30, 636 P.2d at 301.
152. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
153. See State v. Budau, 86 N.M. 21, 518 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 86 N.M.
5, 518 P.2d 1209 (1974).
154, See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
155. 96 N.M. 556, 632 P.2d 1194 (Ct. App. 1981).
156. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-7(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981). The statute provides in full: "When the
court has suspended the execution of a sentence, in whole or in part, the total period of suspension
shall not exceed the maximum length of the term of imprisonment which could have been imposed
by sentence against the defendant for the crime of which he was convicted."
157. 96 N.M. at 557, 632 P.2d at 1195.
158. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
159, N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-15.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
160. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
161. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
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are only applicable where the facts triggering those provisions are on the
record. 62
In State v. Gibson, 163 the defendant entered into a plea and disposition
agreement. Under the agreement, the defendant pled guilty to simple
robbery and the court deferred his sentence for four years while it placed
him on probation. One specific condition of his probation was that he
not live in Luna County without express official permission. The defendant
claimed that this banishment was an improper condition of probation for
constitutional and public policy reasons. 64 While the court of appeals did
not actually hold that a trial court lacks authority to banish a defendant,
even with the defendant's agreement, the court assumed absence of such
authority. The court, however, rejected the defendant's suggested remedy
for the unauthorized condition, which would have been to simply delete
that condition and to maintain the balance of the agreement. The court
of appeals observed that "[i]f a plea agreement is not followed in all its
parts, the entire agreement is rejected."' 65 The Gibson decision appears
designed to preserve the integrity of plea agreements that are the result
of a total bargaining package, which cannot be modified in one of its
items without affecting the whole package.
VI. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
In State v. Stevens, 166 the New Mexico Supreme Court rendered an
important and controversial decision with respect to pretrial prosecutorial
vindictiveness. The question presented in Stevens was whether the third
of a series of successively more serious indictments violated the defend-
ant's right to due process.
In Stevens, the defendant was initially indicted for aggravated assault
and voluntary manslaughter or, in the alternative, involuntary manslaugh-
ter with a firearm enhancement. The defendant moved to suppress certain
evidence. While the first indictment was pending, the prosecution filed
a second indictment charging the defendant with second-degree murder
with a firearm enhancement. After the district attorney filed a nolle pro-
sequi in the first set of charges, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion to suppress. The court subsequently granted a motion to quash
the second indictment because the prosecution had filed that indictment
while the first was still pending. Thereafter the prosecutor obtained a
162. In State v. Crespin, 96 N.M. 640, 633 P.2d 1238 (Ct. App. 1981), the court of appeals on
a related question held that a court is not empowered to extend probation time after imposing a
sentence previously suspended. The court based this rule on the proposition established in State v.
Castillo, 94 N.M. 352, 610 P.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1980), that a trial court lacks authority to increase
a penalty once the penalty has been imposed.
163. 96 N.M. 742, 634 P.2d 1294 (Ct. App. 1981).
164. Id. at 743, 634 P.2d at 1295.
165. Id.
166. 96 N.M. 627, 633 P.2d 1225 (1981).
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third indictment on an open charge of murder. The defendant was conficted
of second-degree murder on this third indictment. On appeal, the court
of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that a presumption
of vindictiveness arose when the prosecutor sought an enhanced indict-
ment after the defendant had exercised a procedural right-filing the
motion to suppress. 167
The state supreme court reversed and affirmed the conviction. The
court held that while a violation of due process could occur under the
circumstances presented in the case, there was as a matter of law in New
Mexico no presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The court dis-
tinguished the United States Supreme Court's decisions in North Carolina
v. Pierce6 ' and Blackledge v. Perry. '69 The court reasoned that allegations
of pretrial prosecutorial vindictiveness implicated a substantially different
balance of interests than the claims of post-appeal pretrial vindictiveness
raised in Pierce and Perry.70 The state supreme court considered the
United States Supreme Court decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes7' to be
more on point. Bordenkircher held that in the course of plea negotiations,
a prosecutor may, consistent with due process, threaten to enhance the
charges against a defendant unless he accepts a plea offer.
72
The Stevens holding is contrary to the majority of cases being decided
by the federal circuit courts.' 73 Nevertheless, the New Mexico Supreme
Court, noting that "the U.S. Supreme Court has never applied the vin-
167. 96 N.M. 753, 756, 635 P.2d 308, 311 (Ct. App. 1981).
168. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
169. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
170. 96 N.M. at 630-31, 633 P.2d at 1228-29. In North Carolina v. Pierce, the Supreme Court
held that the record must reflect the reasons for a heavier sentence imposed by the same judge after
a second conviction resulting from a successful appeal of the original conviction. The Court reasoned
that "vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must
play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. . . . [Dlue process also requires that a
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing
judge." 395 U.S. at 725.
In Perry, the United States Supreme Court extended these concerns to actions by the prosecutor.
The Court found that the prosecutor's conduct in reindicting a defendant on a more serious felony
charge after he exercised a statutory right to a de novo appeal from his misdemeanor conviction,
violated due process because of the improper deterrent effect of a defendant's apprehension of
retaliation. 417 U.S. at 28.
171. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
172. In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor openly admitted that he acted vindictively in obtaining a
subsequent indictment which added a more serious habitual offender enhancement after the defendant
had refused to plea bargain on the original indictment. The United States Supreme Court reasoned
that the defendant's due process rights were not impaired because an increase in charges was a part
of the give and take of plea bargaining and contained no "element of punishment or retaliation so
long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer. " Id. at 363.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Andrews,
633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1977); James v. Rodriguez, 553 F.2d 59 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Malley v. James, 434 U.S. 889 (1977).
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dictiveness notion to a prosecutor's actions in the pretrial and trial stages
of a criminal case," '74 viewed Bordenkircher as departing from, or at
least restricting, Pierce and Perry. The court thought that there would be
"serious problems in applying a Pierce/Perry presumption of vindictive-
ness at the pretrial stage. "I"
The court observed that issues of prosecutorial vindictiveness require
a reconciliation of two conflicting rules of law. On the one hand, "pros-
ecutors have and need broad discretion to file charges where there is
probable cause that someone has broken the law." 176 On the other hand,
"vindictive conduct by persons with the awesome power of prosecutors
• . . is unacceptable and requires control. "' The Stevens court consid-
ered the first consideration to be more weighty where the allegations of
prosecutorial vindictiveness arose during the pretrial period.
It is precisely at the pretrial stage, however, where so many procedural
rights of defendants may be chilled, and thus, where the concerns un-
derlying the Pierce and Perry decisions and the decisions of the federal
circuit courts cited above become most critical. Furthermore, the state
supreme court's reliance on the Bordenkircher's limiting impact upon
Pierce and Perry ignored the fact that the rationale in Bordenkircher
relied heavily on the "give and take"' 78 of plea bargaining. Such "give
and take" is obviously inappropriate with regard to the exercise of pro-
cedural rights.
In State v. Payne,'79 the court of appeals held that prosecutorial mis-
conduct in closing argument required reversal of the defendant's convic-
tion and remand of the case. In Payne, the prosecutor attempted on at
least three different occasions during trial to improperly interject the
defendant's character into evidence. The trial court permitted the pros-
ecutor to say that the state was not allowed to point out that, despite the
fact that the defendant could introduce testimony as to the violent pro-
pensities of the victim, the state was not allowed to introduce similar
174. 96 N.M. at 629, 633 P.2d at 1227.
175. Id. at 630, 633 P.2d at 1228. The state supreme court stated five concerns underlying its
decision: (1) "At the pretrial stage the prosecutor has not gone through the effort of a trial and
therefore has less at stake and less motive to act vindictively." (2) "[Mlany actions taken by a
prosecutor prior to conviction might appear vindictive yet are required by our system of criminal
justice." (3) "Imposition of a pretrial presumption of vindictiveness would interfere with proper
prosecutorial discretion." (4) "If a prosecutor acts vindictively before trial, the defendant still retains
the protection of a jury trial." (5) "[T1he indictments in the present case were obtained through a
grand jury, which traditionally has afforded some protection against improper prosecutorial activity."
Id. at 630-31, 633 P.2d at 1228-29.
176. Id. at 629, 633 P.2d at 1227 (quoting United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 453 (6th
Cir. 1980)).
177. 96 N.M. at 629, 633 P.2d at 1227 (quoting United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449. 453
(6th Cir. 1980)).
178. 434 U.S. at 363.
179. 96 N.M. 347, 630 P.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1981).
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evidence with regard to the defendant.' ° The court of appeals unani-
mously agreed that the prosecutor's conduct was improper in two respects.
First, he had usurped the sole responsibility of the judge in instructing
the jury as to the law in a given case. 8 ' Second, the prosecutor had
suggested that the inadmissible evidence was indeed available but had
been kept from the jury because of a technical rule of evidence:
The essence of the prosecutor's argument was that the prosecution
was not allowed to present evidence of the defendant's character, of
how the defendant beat someone up, but the defense was allowed
to introduce evidence of the victim's character. The impropriety of
this argument is patent; it suggested that defendant did beat up people
and was a bad character; it, in effect, admitted there was no such
evidence, and suggested that the jury would have heard such evi-
dence, if the prosecution had been "allowed to do it. "'182
VII. GRAND JURY
Buzbee v. Donnelly'8 3 may have been the most significant criminal
procedure decision of the Survey period. In Buzbee, the state charged the
defendants with ten counts of first-degree murder arising out of events
which occurred during the New Mexico State Penitentiary riot in February
1980. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictments claiming that the
prosecutors knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence from the grand jury
in violation of section 31-6-1 1(B). 84 The defendants noted that the pros-
ecution withheld three types of exculpatory evidence: (1) statements of
the defendants in which they denied involvement in any killings; (2) prior
statements of grand jury witnesses and other potential witnesses which
were inconsistent with testimony presented to the grand jury; and (3)
promises made to the grand jury witnesses that if they gave statements,
they would not be returned to the penitentiary or to any satellite facili-
ties. t85
The New Mexico Supreme Court, with Justice Sosa and court of ap-
180. The pertinent portions of the prosecutor's closing were as follows:
We are not allowed to go into the defendant's history and present, "On this
date she beat somebody up, etc.," down the line and say and therefore she acted
in conformity therewith. And its [sic] obvious why we aren't allowed to do it.
... But they are allowed to do that to the victim and it's called the prosecutor
mercy rule. They are allowed to go into the character of the victim and unless
they open up the defendant's character by having her take the stand and say
something to the effect of "I'm a peaceful person," I can't touch it. So let's just
let that issue stand right there, all fight?
Id. at 351, 630 P.2d at 303.
181. Id. at 352, 630 P.2d at 304.
182. Id. at 351-52, 630 P.2d at 303-304.
183. 96 N.M. 692, 634 P.2d 1244 (1981).
184. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11(B) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
185. 96 N.M. at 695, 634 P.2d at 1247.
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peals' Judge Wood dissenting, rejected the defendants' contention. The
court first observed that the responsibilities of.the grand jury include
"both the determination of whether there is probable cause that a person
committed a crime and the protection of citizens from the arbitrary and
oppressive acts of the government."' 86 Second, the court stated that this
dual function of the grand jury was possible because the government
maintains the grand jury as an "independent agency from both the Ex-
ecutive and Judicial Departments."' 87 Finally, the court noted that the
grand jury function of finding probable cause was only "in the nature of
an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined;
and the grand jury are only to enquire .. .whether there be sufficient
cause to call upon the party to answer it. "i88 In essence, the court endorsed
the deferential attitude toward the grand jury which the United States
Supreme Court set forth in Costello v. United States. 8 9
In Buzbee the court had the task of construing the language of the New
Mexico grand jury statutes, which required that "the prosecuting attorney
assisting the grand jury shall present evidence that directly negates the
guilt of the target where he is aware of such evidence."' 90 In its analysis,
the court pointed out that the language of the statute required that "all
evidence must be such as would be legally admissible upon trial."' 9 The
court found that that requirement precluded the prosecutor from presenting
the defendants' declarations of innocence, despite the fact that such dec-
larations directly negated the defendants' guilt. The court concluded that
such statements would be "inadmissible as hearsay, except under certain
situations that are not pertinent."' 9 2 The court held that while prior state-
ments of grand jury witnesses and others might be inconsistent with
statements presented to the grand jury, they did not constitute evidence
186. Id. at 696, 634 P.2d at 1248.
187. Id. at 695, 634 P.2d at 1247.
188. Id. at 695, 634 P.2d at 1247.
189. 350 U.S. 359 (1956). In Costello, the Supreme Court upheld an indictment, based solely
on hearsay evidence, against a claim of denial of due process. The Court reasoned that, first, there
would be a great delay in grand jury proceedings if the Court held otherwise, and, second, a contrary
decision would permit a defendant to insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the confi-
dentiality and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. The Costello court observed that,
"[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury ...if valid on its face,
is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits." Id. at 363.
190. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11(B) (Cum. Supp. 1980). This section had been amended prior to
the decision in Buzbee, but the provision controlling Buzbee was the 1980 version. The present
statute is N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11 (Cum. Supp. 1982) and it still requires the prosecutor to present
exculpatory evidence.
191. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-I 1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980). The 1981 legislature amended section
(A) of the provision, eliminating the requirement that evidence be legally admissible upon trial and
adding the following clause: "The sufficiency or competency of the evidence upon which an in-
dictment is returned shall not be subject to review absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the
prosecuting attorney assisting the grand jury." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
192. 96 N.M. at 699, 634 P.2d at 1251.
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directly negating guilt. '93 The Buzbee court concluded that the legislature
intended the term "evidence directly negating guilt" to mean direct, not
circumstantial, evidence.' 94 Because all of the withheld evidence in Buz-
bee, other than the self-serving statements of the defendants, was cir-
cumstantial, the evidence was not appropriate for submission to the grand
jury under section 3 1-6-11 (B). '95
Having disposed of the issues presented by the defendants on statutory
grounds, the majority in Buzbee nevertheless felt constrained to deal in
dictum with related due process considerations. In this regard, the court
noted that the United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly shaped its
holding so as to prevent litigious interference with grand jury proceed-
ings." 196 The Buzbee majority reasoned that the danger that such judicial
deference "will result in the erosion of the power and effectiveness of
the grand jury, by allowing the prosecutor to mislead it . . ." was ad-
193. Id. at 699-700, 634 P.2d at 1251-52. The withheld information included:
1. A witness, who did not testify before the grand jury, did not identify a
defendant in his statement as being one of those implicated.
2. A witness identified a defendant in testifying before the grand jury but had
not identified the same defendant in his prior statement.
3. A witness, who did not testify before the grand jury, said in a statement
that the way a murder was carried out was different than what was described
by other witnesses before the grand jury.
4. A witness, who testified, before the grand jury, named other persons as
participants but not the defendant.
5. A witness whose grand jury testimony implicated a defendant had given a
previous statement in which he was confused as to the identity of the
defendant.
6. Statements that the killers were masked.
7. Statements that a defendant was present for a while at a killing, but the
witness did not see the defendant participate in the killing.
8. A witness, who testified before the grand jury, but changed his mind or
made a mistake as to the identity of the perpetrator in his prior statement.
Id.
194. Id. at 700, 634 P.2d at 1252.
195. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11 (Cum. Supp. 1980). In so ruling, the state supreme court spe-
cifically overruled the court of appeals' decisions in a line of cases which commenced with State v.
Herrera, 93 N.M. 442, 601 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1979). These cases include: State v. Gonzales, 95
N.M. 636, 624 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App. 1981); State v. Lampman, 95 N.M. 279, 620 P.2d 1304 (Ct.
App. 1980); State v. Sanchez, 95 N.M. 27, 618 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1980); State v. Harge. 94 N.M.
11, 606 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1979). It should be noted that in most of these decisions the court of
appeals dismissed the indictment based on due process analysis and not on a construction of the
New Mexico statute requiring introduction of exculpatory evidence. In its subsequent due process
analysis, the majority in Buzbee did not really address the constitutional reasoning set forth by the
court of appeals.
196. 96 N.M. at 702, 634 P.2d at 1254. The Buzbee court observed that, in deference to the
grand jury, the United States Supreme Court has held on several occasions that "indictment returned
by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial
of the charge on the merits." Id. at 697, 634 P.2d at 1249 (citing Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 363 (1956)). The Supreme Court has also refused to extend the exclusionary rule to grand
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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dressed by prohibiting the prosecutor from engaging in "fundamentally
unfair tactics."197
The state supreme court appeared to reject application of the Brady-
Agurs test' 98 to grand jury proceedings, although it has been accepted by
some circuit courts. 9 9 The court suggested that this test was inappropriate
for grand jury proceedings. 2" It reasoned that there is no need to impose
a due process requirement that the prosecutor divulge exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury where such evidence must be divulged to the
defendant before he is tried.20 '
Ultimately the state supreme court reaffirmed its ruling in State v.
Chance,2"2 that an indictment duly returned into court and regular on its
face cannot be challenged with respect to the kind and degree of evi-
dence.2"3 The court left unclear the precise standard for a dismissal of
the grand jury indictment due to a denial of due process. It suggested,
but did not decide, that such dismissal would be appropriate only in the
face of "flagrant prosecutorial misconduct."2 " In addition, the court
197. 96 N.M. at 703-704, 634 P.2d at 1255-56. Such tactics would include: "(I) the prosecution
obtaining an indictment on the basis of evidence known to be prejudicial; and (2) prosecution leading
the Grand Jury to believe it has received eye-witness, rather than hearsay testimony." Id.
198. 96 N.M. at 704-7Q5, 634 P.2d at 1256-57. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution
has a pretrial duty to divulge certain exculpatory evidence to an indicted defendant under certain
circumstances, including where there has been a "pretrial request for specific evidence" if that
evidence "might have affected the outcome of the trial." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. Where a general
request, or no request has been made, the test is whether the omitted evidence created a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt that did not otherwise exist. Id. at 112.
199. See, e.g., Galtieri v. Wainright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).
200. 96 N.M. at 704-705, 634 P.2d at 1256-57. To begin with, "It]he materiality and quantum
of evidence to show probable cause, justifying the return of an indictment, is far less than is necessary
at trial to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An indictment is only a formal
accusation of guilt." Id. Second, and perhaps most important, the very existence of the Brady-Agurs
requirement of pretrial prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence ensures that the defendant's
right to a fair trial guaranteed by due process will be adequately protected. Id. at 705-706, 634 P.2d
at 1257-58. See supra note 198 for a discussion of the Brady-Agurs requirement.
201. See Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670, 604 P.2d 363 (1979). In Maldonado, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that it did not constitute a denial of due process to introduce inadmissible
evidence before the grand jury. For further discussion of Maldonado, see Note, Criminal Procedure-
Grand Jury-Inadmissible Evidence, Due Process. Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670, 604 P.2d 363
(1979), 11 N.M.L. Rev. 451 (1981).
202. 29 N.M. 34, 221 P. 183 (1923).
203. 96 N.M. at 706, 634 P.2d at 1258 (citing State v. Chance, 29 N.M. at 34, 221 P. at 183).
The Buzbee majority held that:
opening up indictments for challenge would halt the orderly process of inves-
tigations, would cause extended litigation on unimportnt issues and would
frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the
criminal laws. It would be an intrusion into the separate provinces of the
constitutionally independent offices of the grand jury and the prosecutor. In
any event, the claimed misconduct would be cured at trial.
96 N.M. at 706, 634 P.2d at 1258.
204. 96 N.M. at 707, 634 P.2d at 1259.
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suggested, but did not decide, that it would not approve the application
of the Brady-Agurs test to grand jury proceedings.
Thus, the entire due process analysis in Buzbee leaves the state of the
law unclear. In addition, at least a portion of the court's statutory analysis
would seem to be no longer applicable under the 1981 amendments to
the statutes.2"5 Furthermore, the state supreme court's interpretation of
the language of the statute that "the prosecuting attorney assisting the
grand jury shall present evidence that directly negates the guilt of the
target where he is aware of such evidence"20 6 seems rather restrictive in
light of the prior decisions of the court of appeals,2 7 precedent from other
jurisdictions,2 8 and the court's concession that "[o]ur statutes in the past
have been very favorable to targets of an investigation as compared to
some other jurisdictions." 2" Because the legislature did not choose to
specify that direct or circumstantial evidence was required, it would seem
that a more appropriate interpretation of the statutory language would be
along the lines suggested by the Buzbee dissent: "[w]hether evidence is
exculpatory is to be determined by objectively examining the withheld
evidence and determining whether, in itself, the withheld evidence in-
dicates that a defendant is not guilty of the crime charged."
21 0
The court's reluctance to intervene in grand jury proceedings would
seem to be more appropriate in instances such as those presented in
Costello v. United States and Maldonado v. State,2 t' where the defendant
was objecting to evidence presented to the grand jury and claimed that
such evidence was inadmissible. In such situations, as well as those where
the defendant is seeking either to suppress or exclude evidence presented
to the grand jury,21 2 societal interests other than those directly implicating
the grand jury and the efficacy of its proceedings are involved. Where
the defendant claims, however, that evidence directly negating his guilt
has been withheld from the grand jury by the prosecutor, the grand jury's
independence from the prosecutor is directly implicated, as is the basic
205. See supra notes 190-91. Insofar as the Buzbee decision was based on the court's interpretation
of the "legally admissible upon trial" language of the prior statute, that analysis would seem no
longer applicable in light of the elimination of that language from the statute in the 1981 amendments.
It seems that the amended statute would require that the "self-serving" statements of the defendants
in Buzbee be presented to the grand jury.
206. 96 N.M. at 698, 634 P.2d at 1250 (emphasis by the court).
207. See supra note 195.
208. See, e.g., Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32
(1975).
209. 96 N.M. at 699, 634 P.2d at 1251.
210. Id. at 708, 634 P.2d at 1260 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
211. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670, 604
P.2d 363 (1979).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S.
251 (1966).
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truth-seeking function of the grand jury. Under such circumstances, only
the courts can protect the grand jury from the prosecutor's encroachments,
and intervention would seem more appropriate. Finally, it seems clear
that when defense counsel represents a client who is the target of a grand
jury investigation, he should request in writing that the prosecutor intro-
duce any exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. First, such a request
assures that the prosecution cannot claim that it did not "know" of the
existence of such evidence. Second, it might also lessen the defendant's
burden in raising a due process challenge to the grand jury proceedings,
in light of the fact that the Buzbee court did not clearly reject the appli-
cation of the Brady-Agurs test to grand jury proceedings.
VIII. PLEAS AND PLEA BARGAINS
In State v. Lucero,2' 3 the court of appeals dealt with a case in which
the defendant had pled guilty to commercial burglary. Sometime there-
after, the state filed a supplementary information claiming that the de-
fendant was an habitual offender with two prior felony convictions. The
defendant moved to dismiss the supplementary information or in the
alternative, to be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to the burglary
charge. The defendant contended that the prosecutor had agreed not to
charge him as an habitual offender in exchange for the guilty plea. There
was no written plea and disposition agreement which recorded the alleged
agreement.
The defendant's counsel testified that she had discussed the plea agree-
ment with the prosecutor. She stated that he had agreed not to charge the
habitual offender offense, but on the condition that the plea agreement
not be mentioned to the trial judge because of the district attorney's office
policy not to admit agreements to forego habitual offender charges on the
record. On the basis of this discussion, defense counsel testified that she
had advised the defendant that the court would probably impose a sentence
on the burglary offense but that the state would initiate no habitual offense
proceedings against him.2 4 The defendant testified that the main reason
for his decision to plead guilty was his understanding that the prosecutor
would not charge him with being an habitual criminal. The district attorney
testified that he did not recall any plea negotiation with defense counsel.
Indeed, he was certain that he had not agreed not to charge the defendant
with being an habitual criminal because he had no authority to make such
a deal.2t5
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss because it was not con-
213. 97 N.M. 346, 639 P.2d 1200 (Ct. App. 1981).
214. Id. at 348, 639 P.2d at 1202.
215. Id.
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vinced that a plea agreement had been reached. The court further denied
the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on its finding that there was no
evidence that the defendant had relied upon his counsel's representations
that the prosecutor would not bring any habitual offender charge.
The court of appeals held that in the absence of any written agreement
or disclosure of the plea agreement in open court as required under Rule
21,216 the trial court, as the trier of fact, could quite properly choose "to
disbelieve the presentation made by defendant and to accept the testimony
produced by the State. '21 7 The court of appeals expressed its concern
with regard to the defendant's allegations of the district attorney's policy
of plea bargaining on habitual charges as long as no written record of
the bargain was made. The court condemned secret plea agreements as
not only impermissible under the rules of criminal procedure but also
"cowardly and unreliable. "218 The court admonished trial courts on the
importance of the second sentence of Rule 21, which provides that the
court "shall also inquire . . . whether the defendant's willingness to plead
• . . results from prior discussions between the attorney for the govern-
ment and the defendant or his attorney. "29 Because of the trial court's
failure to fully comply with this provision of Rule 21, the defendant's
reply to the trial court that his plea was voluntary "does not conclusively
determine that no promises had been made. "22' The court noted, "[h]ad
the trial court made the required second inquiry of all participants in this
case . . . defendant would have been completely foreclosed from later
asserting that the prosecutor had made unkept promises." 22'Thus, based
on the record of the Lucero case, the court of appeals found that the state
had failed to carry its burden of showing that the defendant's guilty plea
resulted from a knowing and intelligent waiver. The court strongly sug-
gested, however, that strict adherence to the requirements of Rule 21
might have enabled the state to carry its burden of persuasion.
Finally, the court concluded that the evidence did not support the trial
court's finding that there was no evidence that the defendant had relied
upon his attorney's representation with regard to the plea bargain. On the
contrary, the defendant had testified that the main reason he agreed to
plead guilty was because his attorney had informed him of the terms of
the specific plea bargain; in addition, there was other evidence corro-
borating the defendant's version of the story.
216. N.M. R. Crim. P. 21 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
217. 97 N.M. at 348, 639 P.2d at 1202.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 349, 639 P.2d at 1203 (emphasis by the court) (citing N.M. R. Crim. P. 21 (Cum.
Supp. 1982)).
220. 97 N.M. at 350, 639 P.2d at 1204.
221. Id.
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In light of this finding of reliance, the court found that the defendant
had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the court
observed that "competent defense counsel would not have permitted
evasion of criminal rules that were intended, at least in part, for the
protection of the defendant, nor would they have engaged in conduct
suspiciously harmful to their clients and adroitly deceptive to the court.,
222
Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court and instructed
it to set aside the convictions and sentences in the commercial burglary
and habitual offender proceedings and to allow withdrawal of the de-
fendant's guilty plea.
This decision reflects an appropriately principled view of the policy
underlying Rule 21. However, the court of appeals ignored the district
attorney's statutory obligation to make charges under all habitual offender
statues. 223 In light of that statutory mandate (which flies in the face of
actual practice),224 it is highly unlikely that the district attorney is going
to be able to state publicly in a plea and disposition agreement that he is
violating his statutory obligation to charge the habitual offense.
IX. TRIAL BY JURY,
In State v. Lopez,225 the court of appeals considered whether the method
of selecting names for the jury wheel violated the sixth amendment by
depriving the defendants, who were members of the La Raza Unida party,
of a fair cross section of the community. The court viewed the defendants'
contention as having two bases: (1) the absence from the jury wheel of
names of La Raza Unida members and (2) the absence from the jury
wheel of names of persons registered to vote who did not vote in the
general election.226
The selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the
community is an essential component of the sixth amendment right to a
222. Id. at 351, 639 P.2d at 1205.
223. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
224. Prosecutors often use the potential of the habitual charge in plea bargaining in New Mexico.
225. 96 N.M. 456, 631 P.2d 1324 (Ct. App. 1981). During the Survey year, the supreme court
also considered a trial by jury issue. In State v. Rickerson, 95 N.M. 666, 625 P.2d 1183 (1981),
the court dealt with the often recurring question of the appropriate conduct for a judge when a jury
is unable to agree on a verdict. For further discussion of this case, see Note, Jury-Trial Judge's
Inquiry into Numerical Division of Jury: State v. Rickerson. 13 N.M.L. Rev. 205 (1983).
226. 96 N.M. at 458, 631 P.2d at 1326. Defendants did not claim that the New Mexico statutory
procedure was not followed. Indeed, in this case, the statutorily prescribed procedure was clearly
followed. The clerk of the court testified that she randomly selected 35% of the names appearing
in the poll books for each voting division in the last election pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-5-3
(1978); that those names were placed in the jury wheel as required by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-5-4
(1978); and that the names of the jury panel were taken from that jury wheel. The poll books, of
course, contain only the names of those who voted in the particular election. Thus, as a result of
the statutorily prescribed jury selection procedure, if no member of the La Raza Unida party voted
in the last general election, then none could be included in the jury wheel.
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jury trial. 27 The court in Lopez set out the standard for establishing a
prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement:
[Tihe defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded
is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation
of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the com-
munity; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 28
The court of appeals applied this standard to the defendants' first claim
of a constitutional violation resulting from the exclusion of La Raza Unida
members. The court found that while the defendants had shown that
members of La Raza Unida were excluded, the exclusion did not appear
to be of La Raza Unida members as a group. In the view of the court,
the procedure excluded persons who did not vote although they were
registered to vote. Consequently, the court found that the defendants' first
claim failed because there was no showing that the state had excluded
La Raza Unida members because they were members of that party.229
The court may have given rather short shrift to the defendants' claim
with regard to the exclusion of La Raza Unida members. In Castaneda
v. Partida,23 ° the United States Supreme Court established an equal pro-
tection test for exclusion of Hispanics from the grand jury which, as the
Lopez court noted, is essentially the same as the sixth amendment stan-
dard. 3 In Castaneda, however, the state had not excluded the members
of the class (Hispanics or Mexican Americans) because they were mem-
bers of that particular ethnic group. Instead, the exclusion was due to the
method of selection of the grand jury venire, which was based on being
a qualified voter.232 This method had resulted indirectly in a systematic
exclusion of Mexican Americans from the grand jury. Thus it would seem
that the court of appeals may have erred in Lopez. Castaneda suggests
that the inquiry should not be whether the selection process excludes
members of a discreet group because they are members of that group,
but rather whether the process by its operation systematically excludes
members of a particular class. With that inquiry, the defendants may have
227. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), the
Supreme Court held that an automatic exemption upon request for women, who constituted 54% of
the adult population in the county, amounted to a systematic exclusion of women because resultant
jury venires averaged less than 15% female.
228. 96 N.M. at 459, 631 P.2d at 1327 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
229. 96 N.M. at 459, 631 P.2d at 1327.
230. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
231. 96 N.M. at 459, 631 P.2d at 1327. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
232. 430 U.S. at 485.
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been able to prevail on their claim if they could have demonstrated that
La Raza Unida members did not vote in the last general election.233
After rejecting the defendants claim as to the exclusion of La Raza
Unida members, the Lopez court went on to consider the second base of
their claim: that the state violated the sixth amendment because it ex-
cluded from the jury wheel the names of persons who were registered to
vote but who did not vote. On this claim the court identified the issue as
whether such persons are "a distinct group in the community." '234 The
court of appeals adopted the three-pronged test for determining what
constitutes a distinct group set out in United States v. Test.235 The Lopez
court found that the defendants had offered no proof that registered voters
who did not vote were a "distinctive" or "cognizable" group. Therefore,
the court held that the second part of the defendants' jury selection claim
was without merit.
X. DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE
In State v. Duran,2 36 the defendant moved to dismiss or to suppress
fingerprint evidence prior to his trial in which he was convicted of second-
degree murder. He argued that the officers investigating the case had
improperly destroyed a Coke can from which a fingerprint matching
Duran's was lifted. The issue presented to the state supreme court was
whether the destruction of the can constituted the improper suppression
of material evidence. The Coke can had been found in'a trash receptacle
at the scene of the crime. Once the fingerprint was lifted off, the can was
returned to the trash receptacle. At that time the police neither knew to
whom the prints belonged nor did they suspect Duran.
The applicable test to determine whether there had been an improper
suppression of material evidence was set out by the New Mexico Court
of Appeals in State v. Lovato.237 Lovato held that reversal of a defendant's
conviction was required if "(1) the State either intentionally deprived the
defendant of evidence, or, by inadvertance, breached a duty to preserve
the evidence; (2) the suppressed evidence was material to the guilt or
innocence of the accused; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by the
233. La Raza Unida members might not have voted because no party members were candidates.
234. 96 N.M. at 459, 631 P.2d at 1327.
235. 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976). A distinct group has the following characteristics: "(1) the
presence of some quality or attribute which 'defines and limits' the group; (2) a cohesiveness of
,attitudes or ideas or experience' which distinguishes the group from the general social milieu; and
(3) a 'community of interest' which may not be represented by other segments of society." Id. at
591.
236. 96 N.M. 364, 630 P.2d 763 (1981).
237. 94 N.M. 780, 617 P.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1980).
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improper suppression of the evidence." 238 Applying this test to the facts
in Duran, the state supreme court held that the destruction of the Coke
can did not require reversal of the defendant's conviction. The court set
out two reasons for its conclusion. First, the court noted that evidence is
material under the Lovato test if it is "material to the guilt or innocence
of the accused." 239 The court concluded that "none of the testimony
indicated that the can was of any further use to either the prosecution or
defense after the fingerprint had been lifted from it. Duran's own expert
testified that the possibility of obtaining a second lifting of the fingerprint
from the can was 'not very probable.' "240 Secondly, the court observed
that the only object which had any real evidentiary value, the fingerprint
itself, "was preserved by the State and available to defense counsel for
testing and analysis." 24"' The court noted that simple common sense com-
pelled its conclusion in Duran. In the court's view, the defendant's claims
would mean that:
all objects from which fingerprints are obtained should be preserved
as evidence. If a fingerprint was obtained from a wall then that portion
of the wall should be cut out and preserved. . .The tons of objects
collected, say in Bernalillo County, would soon fill the Courthouse
and City Hall and demand the construction of more storage space. 242
It would seem that the supreme court's decision was proper based on
the facts in Duran, given the testimony of the defendant's own expert
witness. In some cases, however, additional prints could be obtained from
certain objects. In such cases it would not be necessary to, as the court
suggested, "cut out" portions of walls. Some portable objects could be
held for a reasonable period of time by the police to enable the defense
to inspect them. If the objects were not portable, the police could take
reasonable steps to preserve any fingerprints for a reasonable period of
time. In some cases, at least, the suppression of objects from which
fingerprints have been obtained could be material and their suppression
prejudicial to the defendant.
XI. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
In State v. Nelson,243 the supreme court decided whether a defendant
has a right to have his competence determined by a jury as opposed to
238. 96 N.M. at 365, 630 P.2d at 764 (citing State v. Lovato, 94 N.M. 780, 617 P.2d 169 (Ct.
App. 1980)).
239. 96 N.M. at 365, 630 P.2d at 764. See also State v. Morris, 69 N.M. 244, 365 P.2d 668
(1961); Chacon v. State, 88 N.M. 198, 539 P.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1975).
240. 96 N.M. at 365, 630 P.2d at 764.
241. Id. at 365, 630 P.2d at 764.
242. Id. at 366, 630 P.2d at 765.
243. 96 N.M. 654, 634 P.2d 676 (1981).
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a judge, for purposes of an habitual offender proceeding. In Nelson, a
hearing was held on the defendant's competency on the first day of the
habitual offender proceeding. There was conflicting evidence as to Nel-
son's competency, but the most recent evidence presented orally char-
acterized him as incompetent. Nevertheless, the court determined that
Nelson was competent for purposes of the proceeding. The trial court
refused to permit ajury determination of the issue. On review, the supreme
court considered two specific issues: (1) whether Rule 35(b)244 was ap-
plicable to habitual offender proceedings, and (2) whether the constitution
required a jury determination of competence in habitual offender pro-
ceedings.
The court then discussed three characteristics of the habitual offender
proceeding. The court noted that a defendant charged as an habitual
offender must respond to the charge stating whether he is the same person
as indicated in the information. If that becomes a factual issue, a jury is
impaneled to make the relevant inquiry. Second, in the view of the
supreme court, the habitual offender statute does not create a new offense
244. N.M. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides:
(b) Determination of competency to stand trial.
(1) How raised. The issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial
may be raised by motion, or upon the court's own motion, at any stage
of the proceedings.
(2) Determination. The issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial
shall be determined by the judge, unless the judge finds there is evidence
which raises a reasonable doubt as [to] the defendant's competency to
stand trial.
(i) If a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competency to stand
trial is raised prior to trial, the court, without a jury, may determine
the issue of competency to stand trial; or, in its discretion, may
submit the issue of competency to stand trial to a jury, other than
the trial jury.
(ii) If the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial is raised
during trial, the trial jury shall be instructed on the issue. If,
however, the defendant has been previously found by a jury to be
competent to stand trial, the issue of the defendant's competency
to stand trial shall be submitted to the trial jury only if the court
finds that there is evidence which was not previously submitted
to a jury which raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
competency to stand trial.
(3) Proceedings on finding of incompetency. If a defendant is found in-
competent to stand trial:
(i) further proceedings in the criminal cae shall be stayed until the
defendant becomes competent to stand trial;
(ii) the court, where appropriate, may order treatment to enable the
defendant to attain competency to stand trial;
(iii) the court may review and amend the conditions of release pursuant
to Rule 22 of these rules.
(4) Mistrial. If the finding of incompetency is made during the trial, the
court shall declare a mistrial.
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but merely provides a proceeding for enhancing sentences.245 In its third
point, however, the court conceded that an habitual offender charge is
serious and that the potential for prejudice is so great that several char-
acteristics of a trial, such as the right to counsel, the right to a jury, and
the rules of evidence, are imposed to protect the defendant.246 Indeed, the
habitual offender proceeding statute itself states that a defendant has a
"right to be tried as to the truth. 24
7
Under Rule 35(b)(2), there is a right to a jury determination only where
reasonable doubt of the defendant's competence to stand trial exists and
if the issue is raised during trial. When the issue is raised post-trial, there
is no right to a jury determination.248 In the view of the supreme court,
Rule 35 indicates a restrictive approach to the right to trial by jury in
competency proceedings. Thus the court concluded that:
the right to have a jury determination of competency attaches only
where competency to stand trial is at issue and when a reasonable
doubt is raised after the trial has begun but before it has ended. In
all other instances, the judge has discretion to make the determination
himself or to submit the issue to a non-trial jury. . . .Questions as
to sentencing competency are always decided by a court alone re-
gardless of when the question is raised.
249
The court further held that the constitutional requirements for jury de-
termination of competency are coextensive with Rule 35. Specifically,
the court stated that "the constitutional right to a jury determination of
trial competency should be limited to the specific right recognized in Rule
35." 5° The court reasoned that although a habitual offender proceeding
has many of the characteristics of a trial, it is not a trial in the constitutional
sense for purposes of making a determination as to competency.
25 1
245. 96 N.M. at 655, 634 P.2d at 677. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
246. 96 N.M. at 655, 634 P.2d at 677.
247. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-20(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (emphasis added).
248. 96 N.M. at 656, 634 P.2d at 678. State v. Sena, 92 N.M. 676, 594 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.
1979).
249. 96 N.M. at 657, 634 P.2d at 679.
250. Id. at 657, 634 P.2d at 679.
251. This conclusion is consistent with and probably required by prior decisions of the supreme
court in which the court held that an habitual offender proceeding was not a trial for double jeopardy
purposes. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 96 N.M. 585, 633 P.2d 693 (1981); State v. James, 94
N.M. 604, 614 P.2d 16 (1980).
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